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a b s t r a c t
Encrypted key exchange (EKE) authentication approaches are very important for secure
communicating over public networks. In order to solve the security weaknesses three-
party EKE, Yeh et al. [H.T. Yeh, H.M. Sun, T. Hwang, Efficient three-party authentication
and key agreement protocols resistant to password guessing attacks, Information Science
and Engineering 19 (6) (2003) 1059–1070.] proposed two secure and efficient three-party
EKE protocols. Based on the protocol developed by Yeh et al., two improved EKE protocols
for authentication and key agreement are proposed in this study. The computational costs
of the proposed protocols are the same as those of the protocols of Yeh et al. However,
the numbers of messages in the communication are fewer than those of the protocols
of Yeh et al. Furthermore, the round efficient versions of our proposed protocols are also
described.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Encrypted key exchange authentication approaches are very important and widely applied in network communication
[1–6]. In these authentication approaches, the communicating parties share a secrete key with a trusted server and can
exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network with the help of a server.
Secure communication protocols should provide security requirements, which are described as follows.
1. Mutual authentication: Mutual authentication protocols enable participants mutually to authenticate each other’s
identity.
2. Session key security: A communication protocol exhibits session key security if the session key cannot be obtained
without any long-term secrets.
3. Off-line guessing attacks: In an off-line password guessing attack, an attacker guesses a password and verifies his guess,
but he does not need to participate in any communication during the guessing phase [4,5,7–11].
4. Undetectable on-line guessing attacks: In an on-line guessing attack, an attacker searches to verify a guessed password
in an on-line transaction and a failed guess cannot be detected and logged by the server [12,13].
5. Perfect forward secrecy: A protocol has perfect forward secrecy if the compromise of long-life keys does not compromise
previous session keys.
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Fig. 1. The three-party EKE protocol of Yeh et al..
6. Known-key security: If a protocol has known-key security, the compromise of one session key does not reveal other
session keys.
7. Intruder-in-the-middle attacks: The intruder-in-the-middle attack is that an intruder interrupts a message and
substitutes it for his own message, so that communication parties compute the wrong session key without detecting
the intruder.
8. Replay attacks: A replay attack is that an unauthorized party records previous messages and uses them to cheat the
receiver in later processes [14].
9. Stolen-verifier attacks: The stolen-verifier attack is that the adversary who has stolen the verifier of a user’s password
can impersonate as that user.
Recently, many encrypted key exchange authentication approaches were presented for secure communicating over
public networks. Bellovin and Merritt [1] proposed a key exchange protocol based on memorable passwords between two
communicating parties known as the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) in 1992. From then on, numbers of password-based
authentication and key agreement approaches have been proposed and developed in many communication systems. Gong
et al. [9] proposed a three party authentication protocol, in which the server is responsible for user authentication and
distributes the common session key shared between two users. Later, Steiner et al. proposed a three-party EKE [2] which
extended the EKE to a three-party model where two clients registering in the same server can share a secret session key
through theprotocol. However, Lin et al. [13] andYeh et al. [15] stated theweaknesses of three-party EKEproposedby Steiner
et al. Besides, Yeh et al. [15] proposed two new secure three-party EKE protocols for authentication and key agreement. One
is a plaintext-equivalent authentication protocol and the other is a verifier-based authentication protocol. In a plaintext-
equivalent protocol, a client and a server usually authenticate each other through their shared secret password. A system
using a plaintext-equivalent protocol becomes instantly compromised if the server’s database containing clients’ passwords
is revealed. Comparatively, a verified-based protocol only requires a verifier to be stored in server’s database and hence add
another method to verify the client’s possession of actual password, as opposed to a stolen verifier from the password
file [15].
In a Diffie-Hellman-based authentication protocol, only revealing the information gx and gy for generating the session
key (gxy) cannot compromise the session key. The clients can directly exchange the information gx and gy for generating the
session key without the help of the server, and thus the improved protocols can decrease the messages in communications.
Using this technique, this investigation proposes communication-efficient three-party EKE protocols based on the protocols
of Yeh et al. The computation costs of the protocols developed by Yeh et al. and the proposed protocols herein are equal.
However, the numbers of messages in the proposed protocols are reduced. Moreover, the round efficient versions of these
protocols are presented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al. Section 3
introduces the improved three-party EKE protocols. Section 4 provides security and performance analyses of the improved
protocols. Finally, Section 5 gives the conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
This section describes the underlying primitives used in this paper and briefly reviews the three-party EKE protocols of
Yeh et al. [15]. The underlying primitives include the Discrete Logarithms problem and the Diffie-Hellman assumptions [16].
Table 1 details the notation used, and Fig. 1 depicts the three-party EKE protocol of Yeh et al., which works as follows.
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Table 1
Notation.
A, B, S A and B are two communication parties and S is a trusted server
Pa, Pb Passwords of A and B shared with S
(Spa, Vpa) (private, public) key derived from Pa and shared with S
(Spb, Vpb) (private, public) key derived from Pb and shared with S
Ks Public key of the Trust Server
x, y, z, a, b, ra, rb, X Random numbers
K Session key between A and B
[info]K Symmetric-key encryption of ‘‘info’’ with key K .
{info}K Asymmetric-key encryption of ‘‘info’’ with key K .
〈info〉K Digital signature of ‘‘info’’ with key K
h () One-way hash function.
A→ B : M A sends a messageM to B.
g Base generator
p The modulus (all exponentiation in modulo p)
Fa The first 64 bits of message 1 in proposed protocol
Fig. 2. The verifier-based three-party EKE of Yeh et al..
Definition 2.1 (The Discrete Logarithms Problem (DLP)). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order q and x is randomly
chosen in Zq. Consider the equation y = gxmod p. Given g , x and p, it is a straightforward matter to calculate y. However,
given y, g and p, it is computationally infeasible to calculate x.
Definition 2.2 (The Diffie-Hellman Assumptions). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order q and x, y are randomly chosen
in Zq. Given g , gx, gy and p, if the equation z = gxymod p holds, then it is computationally infeasible to calculate z without
the value of x or y.
2.1. The three-party EKE protocol of Yeh et al.
Step 1. A→ B: A, {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks
User A selects two random numbers ra, x, and computes gx(mod p)which is encrypted by password Pa of A. Then
A encrypts (A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra) by the public key Ks of server and sends the ciphertext to B.
Step 2. B→ S: A, {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks , B, {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks
On receiving the message from A, B composes a similar message to A and sends them to S.
Step 3. S → B : [A, gy]ra, [B, gx]rb
Server S decrypts {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks , {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks with his private key and checks the
authenticities of both A and B. Then S encrypts (A, gy) with ra, encrypts (B, gx) with rb and sends them to B.
Step 4. B→ A : [A, gy]ra, [Fa]K
B decrypts [B, gx]rb with rb and computes the session key K ≡ (gx)y(mod p). Then he sends a key confirmation
message [Fa]K and forwards [A, gy]ra to A.
Step 5. A→ B : [h(Fa)]K
A decrypts [A, gy]ra withra and computes the session key K ≡ (gy)x(mod p). Then he decrypts [Fa]K with the
session key K , checks its validity, and responds with [h(Fa)]K for key confirmation.
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Fig. 3. Proposed efficient three-party EKE protocol.
2.2. The verifier-based three-party EKE protocol of Yeh et al. (shown on Fig. 2)
Step 1. A→ B : A, {A, B, gx, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks
A generates the message A,{A, B, gx, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks and sends it to S via B. B is a similar legitimate user to A.
Step 2. B→ S : A, {A, B, gx, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks , B, {B, A, gy, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks
B composes a similar message and sends it to S. Server S checks the authenticity of both A and B.
Step 3. S → B : [A, gy]ra, [B, gx]rb
Server S uses the ra and rb generated by A and B, respectively, as encrypting keys replies with message
[A, gy]ra,[B, gx]rb.
Step 4. B→ A : [A, gy]ra, [Fa]K
B gets the messages and computes the session key K ≡ (gx)y(mod p). He then sends [A, gy]ra, [Fa]K to A, where
Fa is produced by the partial bit stream of (A, {A, B, gx, 〈gx〉SPa , ra}Ks ).
Step 5. A→ B : [h(Fa)]K
Similarly, A gets the messages and computes the session key K ≡ (gy)x(mod p). If A successfully confirms [Fa]K ,
then he uses a hash value as a response value to B. Finally, B verifies the key confirmation message [h(Fa)]K .
3. Communication-efficient three-party EKE protocols
This section presents two communication-efficient authentication and key agreement protocols based on the protocol
of Yeh et al. [15]. One is a plaintext-equivalent authentication protocol and the other is a verifier-based authentication
protocol. The computation costs of the protocols developed by Yeh et al. are equal to those of the protocols proposed herein.
However, the number of transmissions is fewer than those of the protocols of Yeh et al. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the proposed
authentication and key agreement protocol and verifier-based three-party EKE protocols, respectively. The protocols are
described in detail as follows.
3.1. Proposed efficient three-party EKE protocol
Step 1. A→ B : A, {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks , gx
A selects two random numbers ra, x, and computes gx(mod p) which is encrypted by password Pa of A. Then he
encrypts (A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra) by the public key Ks of the server and sends it with gx to B.
Step 2. B→ S : A, {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks , B, {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks , gy, [Fa]K
On receiving the message from A, B composes a similar message to A and gets gx to produce the session key
K ≡ (gx)y(mod p). Then B sends the message to S.
Step 3. S → A : [A, gy]ra, [B, gx]rb, [Fa]K
Server S decrypts {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks and {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks with his private key and checks the
authenticities of both A and B. Then S encrypts (A, gy) with ra; encrypts (B, gx) with rb; and sends them with a
key confirmation message [Fa]K to A.
Step 4. A→ B : [B, gx]rb, [h(Fa)]K
A decrypts [A, gy]rawith ra and computes the session key K = (gy)x. Then he sends [h(Fa)]K and forwards [B, gx]rb
to B. Finally, B validates gx by checking and decrypting [B, gx]rb with rb.
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Fig. 4. Proposed efficient verifier-based three-party EKE protocol.
By rearranging and sending themessages in parallel, the proposed efficient three-party EKE protocol can be implemented in
less time and obtain a round-efficient version. The round-efficient protocol can be executed in three rounds and is described
below.
Round 1. A→ B : A, gx
A→ S : A, {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks .
Round 2. B→ A : B, gy, [Fa]K
B→ S : B, {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks
Round 3. S → A : [A, gy]ra
S → B : [B, gx]rb
A→ B : [h(Fa)]K .
3.2. Proposed efficient verifier-based three-party EKE protocol
Step 1. A→ B : A, {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks , gx
A generates ra, x; computes gx(mod p), 〈gx〉Spa and sends the message A, {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks , gx to S via B. B is a
similar legitimate user to A.
Step 2. B→ S : A, {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks , gx, B, {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks , gy, [Fa]K
B gets gx to compute the session key K ≡ (gx)y(mod p). Then he composes a similar message and sends it to S.
Server S checks the authenticity of both A and B.
Step 3. S → A : [A, gy]ra, [B, gx]rb, [Fa]K
Server S decrypts {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks and {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks with his private key for checking the authenticities
of both A and B. Then S encrypts (A, gy) with ra; encrypts (B, gx) with rb; and sends them with a key confirmation
message [Fa]K to A.
Step 4. A→ B : [B, gx]rb, [h(Fa)]K
A decrypts [A, gy]rawith ra and computes the session keyK ≡ (gy)x(mod p). Then he sends [h(Fa)]K and forwards
[B, gx]rb to B. Finally, B validates gx by checking and decrypting [B, gx]rb with rb.
Similarly, a round-efficient version of the proposed verifier-based protocol can be obtained by rearranging and sending the
messages in parallel. The round-efficient protocol can also be executed in three rounds and is described below.
Round 1. A→ B : A, gx
A→ S : A, {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks
Round 2. B→ A : B, gy, [Fa]K
B→ S : B, {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks
Round 3. S → A : [A, gy]ra
S → B : [B, gx]rb
A→ B : [h(Fa)]K .
4. Security and performance analyses
This section describes the security analyses of the proposed three-party EKE protocols and compares their performance
with that of the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al.
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4.1. Security analyses
4.1.1. Security analyses of the improved three-party EKE protocol
1. Mutual authentication
On receiving {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks and {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks in Step 2, S can authenticate A and B by verifying
Pa and Pb, respectively. Additionally, A and B can validate gy and gx, and authenticate S simultaneously by decrypting
[A, gy]ra with ra and [B, gx]rb with rb in Step 3 and Step 4, respectively. Hence, the proposed protocol exhibits mutual
authentication.
2. Session key security
Given gx (or gy), the value x (or y) is hard to obtain, because of the Discrete Logarithm problem. Given gx and gy, the
session key K ≡ (gy)x(mod p) or K ≡ (gx)y(mod p) cannot be determined without knowledge of x or y, because of the
Diffie-Hellman problem.
3. Off-line guessing attacks
In the proposed protocol, ra, gx, rb and gy are random numbers and KS is the server public key, so no information
can be used to verify directly the correctness of the guessed passwords from {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks in Step 1 and{A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks in Step 2. Hence, the proposed protocol resists off-line guessing attacks.
4. Undetectable on-line guessing attacks
In the proposed protocol, on receivingmessages from B in Step 2, server S authenticates A and B by verifying Pa and Pb
in {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks and {A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks , respectively. Therefore, a failed guess will be detected by S. Hence,
the proposed protocol can resist undetectable on-line guessing attacks.
5. Perfect forward secrecy
In the improved protocol, the ephemeral exponents x and y are randomly selected and independent among each
protocol execution. Therefore, the compromised passwords Pa and Pb cannot reveal any previous session keys K ≡
gxy(mod p). Therefore, the proposed protocol has perfect forward secrecy.
6. Known-key security
The session keys K ≡ gxy(mod p) generated in different runs are independent since A and B randomly selects x and
y, respectively, and these random numbers are independent among protocol executions. Hence, the proposed protocol
exhibits known-key security.
7. Intruder-in-the-middle attacks
Since the improved protocol has mutual authentication, the intruder-in-the-middle attacks are necessarily
unsuccessful.
8. Replay attacks
An attacker tries to deceive B (or A) and S by sending out a previous message {A, B, [A, B, gx]Pa , ra}Ks (or{A, B, [A, B, gy]Pb , rb}Ks ). The attacker cannot compute the session key K ≡ gx·y(mod p) since he does not know the
values of x and y. Accordingly, he cannot correctly send out a key confirmation message and the replay attack will fail.
4.1.2. Security analyses of the improved verifier-based three-party EKE protocol
1. Mutual authentication
On receiving {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks and {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks in Step 2, S can authenticate A and B by verifying Spa and Spb,
respectively. Additionally, A and B can validate gy and gx, and authenticate S simultaneously by decrypting [A, gy]ra with
ra and [B, gx]rb with rb in Step 3 and Step 4, respectively. Hence, the proposed protocol exhibits mutual authentication.
2. Session key security
Given gx (or gy), the value x (or y) is hard to obtain, because of the Discrete Logarithm problem. Given gx and gy, the
session key K ≡ (gy)x(mod p) or K ≡ (gx)y(mod p) cannot be determined without knowledge of x or y, because of the
Diffie-Hellman problem.
3. Off-line guessing attacks
In the proposed protocol, ra, gx, rb and gy are random numbers and KS is the server public key, so no information
can be used to verify directly the correctness of the guessed passwords from {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks and {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks .
Hence, the proposed protocol resists off-line guessing attacks.
4. Undetectable on-line guessing attacks
In this protocol, server S authenticates A and B by verifying Spa and Spb in {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks and {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks ,
respectively. Therefore, a failed guess will be detected by S. Hence, the proposed protocol can resist undetectable on-line
guessing attacks.
5. Perfect forward secrecy
In the improved protocol, the ephemeral exponents x and y are randomly selected and independent among each
protocol execution. Therefore, the compromised password cannot reveal any previous session keys. Therefore, the
proposed protocol has perfect forward secrecy.
6. Known-key security
The session keys generated in different runs are independent since A and B randomly selects x and y, respectively, and
these random numbers are independent among protocol executions. Hence, the proposed protocol exhibits known-key
security.
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Table 2
Performance comparisons with related protocols.
Protocols Random numbers Computational cost Steps Rounds
Exponential Asymmetric encryption
Yeh et al.’s 3PEKE 4 4 2 5 –
Proposed 3PEKE 4 4 2 4 3
Yeh et al.’s VB-3PEKE 4 4 4 5 –
Proposed VB-3PEKE 4 4 4 4 3
7. Intruder-in-the-middle attacks
Since the improved protocol has mutual authentication, the intruder-in-the-middle attacks are necessarily
unsuccessful.
8. Replay attacks
An attacker tries to deceiveB (orA) and S by sending out a previousmessage {A, B, 〈gx〉Spa , ra}Ks (or {B, A, 〈gy〉Spb , rb}Ks ).
The attacker cannot compute the session key K ≡ gx·y(mod p) since he does not know the values of x and y. Accordingly,
he cannot correctly send out a key confirmation message and the replay attack will fail.
9. Stolen-verifier attacks
The adversary who has stolen the verifier Vpa (or Vpb) of user A’s password Pa (or user B’s password Pb) cannot
impersonate as that user A (or B) since 〈gx〉Spa (or 〈gy〉Spb ) cannot be determined without knowledge of the private key
Spa (or Spb). Accordingly, the proposed protocol can resist stolen-verifier attacks.
4.2. Performance analyses and comparisons
Table 2 compares the performances of the proposed three-party EKE (3PEKE) protocols with those of the three-party EKE
protocols of Yeh et al. For plaintext-equivalent, both the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al. and the proposed three-
party EKE protocol use four random numbers computations, four modular exponential computations and two asymmetric
encryption computations. However, the proposed protocol has one step less than the three-party EKE protocol of Yeh et al.
Besides, for verifier-based, both the protocols (VB-3PEKE) of Yeh et al. and the proposed protocol require four random
number computations, four modular exponential computations and four asymmetric encryption computations. However,
the proposed protocol also has one step less than the protocol of Yeh et al. Besides, both the round-efficient protocol can be
executed in three rounds.
5. Conclusions
This study proposes two communication-efficient three-party EKE protocols based on the three-party EKE protocol of
Yeh et al. One is a plaintext-equivalent authentication protocol and the other is a verifier-based authentication protocol.
The computation cost of the proposed three-party EKE protocols is equal to that of the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh
et al. In addition, the proposed three-party EKE protocols reveal the same information with the three-party EKE protocols of
Yeh et al. According the Diffie-Hellman assumptions and security analyses of the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al.,
the proposed three-party EKE protocols also achieve the security requirements of three-party EKE protocols. However,
the proposed protocols have one step less than the three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al. Therefore, the proposed three-
party EKE protocols are more efficient than three-party EKE protocols of Yeh et al. Moreover, the proposed protocols can be
executed in three rounds by arranging the messages in parallel.
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